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1. Introduction
Although numerous independent assessments have found that 
the scientific community has reached a near-unanimous con-
sensus on the reality of human-caused climate change,[1–4] the 
general public has become increasingly polarized on the issue, 
particularly in the United States.[5,6] This is problematic because 
addressing global climate change will require large-scale 
changes in human behavior and decision-making.[7]
Effectively addressing climate change requires significant changes in indi-
vidual and collective human behavior and decision-making. Yet, in light of 
the increasing politicization of (climate) science, and the attempts of vested-
interest groups to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change 
through organized “disinformation campaigns,” identifying ways to effec-
tively engage with the public about the issue across the political spectrum 
has proven difficult. A growing body of research suggests that one promising 
way to counteract the politicization of science is to convey the high level 
of normative agreement (“consensus”) among experts about the reality of 
human-caused climate change. Yet, much prior research examining public 
opinion dynamics in the context of climate change has done so under condi-
tions with limited external validity. Moreover, no research to date has exam-
ined how to protect the public from the spread of influential misinformation 
about climate change. The current research bridges this divide by exploring 
how people evaluate and process consensus cues in a polarized information 
environment. Furthermore, evidence is provided that it is possible to pre-
emptively protect (“inoculate”) public attitudes about climate change against 
real-world misinformation.
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Polarization can be amplified when 
the inherent uncertainty of science itself 
is used to cast doubt on the existence of 
a scientific consensus.[8] For example, 
ideologically motivated, vested-interest 
groups known as “Merchants of Doubt” 
have orchestrated influential “disinfor-
mation campaigns” in which they pub-
licly dispute the scientific consensus on 
various issues, including human-caused 
climate change.[9,10] These campaigns have 
not only successfully undermined public 
understanding of the degree of scientific 
agreement on climate change, they have 
also increased existing political polariza-
tion[11] and limited deeper societal engage-
ment with the issue.[10,12,13]
1.1. Perceived Scientific Consensus as a 
Gateway Cognition
One promising way to counteract the 
politicization of science is to highlight the 
strong scientific consensus about an issue when a scientific 
consensus exists.[8,14,15] For example, a large body of research 
has found that “perceived scientific agreement” is a key deter-
minant of the public’s opinion on climate change.[16–23] In a 
complex and uncertain world, people often look to experts for 
guidance.[24] Accordingly, research has found that in the absence 
of motivation to cognitively elaborate on a message, people 
tend to heuristically rely on consensus cues to form judgments 
about sociopolitical issues,[25–27] particularly because doing so is 
often socially adaptive, as “consensus implies correctness.”[28] 
In fact, people prefer to take cues from the combined judgment 
of multiple experts.[29] As such, adopting consensus beliefs can 
improve judgment-accuracy and reduce the cost of learning by 
condensing complex science into a simple fact (e.g., “97% of 
climate scientists have concluded that human-caused global 
warming is happening”). At the same time, the politicization 
of science can undermine the influence of consensus infor-
mation by triggering a motivation for (some) citizens to dis-
miss otherwise credible scientific evidence.[16,30] Furthermore, 
research finds that people’s perception of expert consensus 
(even when correct) is easily undermined by anecdotal evidence 
and “false media balance,” both of which can distort the actual 
weight of evidence.[31] Thus, in the face of political polariza-
tion, effectively communicating with the public about the sci-
entific consensus requires knowledge about; (a) the way in 
which people attend to, process, and organize new information 
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and (b) the structural nature of the information environment 
in which people form judgments and opinions about climate 
change.
On one hand, research has offered ample evidence for 
instances in which confirmation bias and motivated rea-
soning can lead (some) people to selectively process informa-
tion and reject evidence that runs contrary to prior beliefs or 
deeply held ideological worldviews.[32–36] For example, the cul-
tural cognition thesis predicts that conveying scientific agree-
ment about contested societal issues will only increase attitude 
polarization.[37]
On the other hand, scholars have questioned the validity of 
the cultural cognition thesis,[38,39] especially because the biased 
assimilation of information is just one of many ways by which 
people can orient themselves toward science and the environ-
ment.[40] A substantial body of research has found that commu-
nicating the degree of scientific agreement on contested societal 
issues, such as vaccines and climate change, can shift public 
perception of the scientific consensus, which in turn influences 
other key beliefs, such as the belief that climate change is hap-
pening, human-caused, and a serious issue that requires public 
action.[7,41]
People’s subjective perceptions about what other groups 
believe (i.e., “metacognitions”) often serve as informational 
judgment cues. Accordingly, many studies find that conveying 
the fact that most scientists are convinced that human-caused 
climate change is happening can increase perceived consensus 
and acceptance of anthropogenic climate change across the 
ideological spectrum, either directly or indirectly.[19,42–44] In par-
ticular, the gateway belief model (GBM) developed by van der 
Linden et al.[7] suggests that reducing the “gap” between peo-
ple’s subjective perception and the actual of level of normative 
agreement among influential referents (e.g., experts) can lead 
to small yet important changes in other key personal beliefs. 
Indeed, much social–psychological research has shown that 
debiasing people’s perception of the norm often has a positive 
cascading effect on other personal beliefs and behaviors.[45,46] 
Yet, although highlighting scientific consensus can neutralize 
polarizing worldviews[19,44] and reduce motivated reasoning,[8] 
more mixed evidence has also been noted.[47]
1.2. Countering the Spread and Influence of Misinformation: 
Inoculation Theory
More generally, people often process conflicting informational 
cues at the same time.[48] Thus, although highlighting scien-
tific agreement has been found effective under stylized condi-
tions, its efficacy in the presence of real-world misinformation 
remains unclear.[49,50] Yet, evaluating this is important because 
the pairing of conflicting informational cues is an explicit 
opportunity to examine motivated cognition. To our knowledge, 
no research to date has examined if and how public beliefs 
about the scientific consensus on climate change are affected 
by, or can be protected against, “sticky” misinformation. In fact, 
researchers have recently conceptualized the process by which 
misinformation spreads through a population as a metaphor-
ical “contagion.”[51] A closely related term is a “meme,” which 
is often described as an idea, behavior, or style that spreads 
from person to person within a culture.[52,53] In the context of 
global warming, a false meme can be thought of as an inac-
curate mental belief (e.g., there is no consensus among cli-
mate scientist) that is transmitted (replicated) from one mind 
to another.[54] Because of their socially infectious nature, (false) 
memes are sometimes referred to as “thought contagions.”[55]
The rate of cultural transmission, or infection, may be 
slowed through a process known as attitudinal inoculation. In 
medicine, resistance to a virus can be conferred by exposing 
someone to a weakened version of the virus (a vaccine)—strong 
enough to trigger a response (i.e., the production of antibodies), 
but not so strong as to overwhelm the body’s immune system. 
The social–psychological theory of attitudinal inoculation[56] 
follows a similar logic: A threat is introduced by forewarning 
people that they may be exposed to information that challenges 
their existing beliefs or behaviors. Then, one or more (weak-
ened) examples of that information are presented and directly 
refuted in a process called “refutational pre-emption” or “preb-
unking.”[14] In short, attitudinal resistance is conferred by 
pre-emptively highlighting false claims and refuting potential 
counterarguments.
Although a large body of research on inoculation theory 
has demonstrated its efficacy[57] in a variety of applied con-
texts, most notably in the areas of health[58] and political cam-
paigning,[59] inoculation theory has not been tested in the 
context of climate change. Moreover, prior inoculation theory 
research has primarily examined how positive attitudes toward 
simple “cultural truisms” can be maintained.[60] Yet, there are 
many issues, including climate change, where people have 
strongly differing pre-existing (political) attitudes. Accordingly, 
this study addresses the following two key research questions: 
(1) does the presence of misinformation “negate” the posi-
tive effect of communicating the scientific consensus on cli-
mate change? And if so, (2) is it possible to “inoculate” public 
attitudes about the degree of scientific consensus against 
(influential) misinformation? Drawing on prior research, we 
hypothesize that the process of inoculation will indeed protect 
pre-existing (positive) attitudes as well as help counteract moti-
vated reasoning.
2. Method
Two studies were conducted to answer these research ques-
tions. In the first study, we used a nationally representative 
probability sample of the US population (N = 1000) to test sev-
eral misinformation statements about the scientific consensus 
on human-caused climate change. The purpose of Study 1 
was to identify the most influential and representative “coun-
termessages” used by climate change opponents. In Study 2, 
we conducted a randomized online survey experiment using a 
large and diverse sample (N = 2167) from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (Mturk) to test whether it is possible to “inoculate” people 
against such misinformation (see Part B in the Supporting 
Information for more information about Mturk). We employed 
a mixed design that compared a participant’s pre–post (within-
subject) estimate of the scientific consensus across (between) 
six different experimental conditions. An overview of the dif-
ferent experimental conditions is provided in Table 1.
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In short, we hypothesized that communicating the scientific 
consensus (by itself) would have a positive influence on per-
ceived scientific agreement (condition 2), whereas the coun-
termessage (by itself) would have a negative impact (condition 3). 
We also hypothesized that the presence of counterinformation 
would diminish the general efficacy of the consensus message 
(condition 4). Finally, as a direct test of inoculation, we hypothe-
sized that both a general and more specific inoculation message 
would protect the consensus-treatment against the misinforma-
tion statement (conditions 5 and 6). Participants in the control 
group (condition 1) solved a neutral word puzzle.
Study 1 investigated which countermessage was most influ-
ential with the American public. Six common statements were 
tested (see Part A in the Supporting Information for a full 
description of the study). Respondents ranked each statement 
on two dimensions: familiarity and persuasiveness. Out of all 
statements, respondents were most familiar with and convinced 
by the argument that “there is no consensus on human-caused 
climate change.” This argument was based on a real disinfor-
mation campaign (“The Oregon Global Warming Petition Pro-
ject,” 2007)[61] which hosts a website claiming that; “over 31 000 
American scientists have signed a petition stating that there is 
no scientific evidence that the human release of carbon dioxide 
will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the 
Earth’s atmosphere.” An exact copy of the petition was used as 
the main countermessage in Study 2, but all identifying source-
information was redacted to prevent confounding effects 
between the source and the message.
Prior research has found that the scientific consensus is 
effectively communicated in the form of a pie chart stating: 
“97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused 
climate change is happening.”[44] To ensure a representative 
study design in which the messages shown to participants 
reflect real-world content, we mimicked the design of the 
pie chart used by the “Consensus Project”[62]—because this 
graphic has frequently been featured in the media. The inocu-
lation messages consisted of two components: (a) warning of 
an impending threat/attack on one’s prior beliefs and attitudes 
(affective component) and (b) a pre-emptive refutation (cogni-
tive component). In the shorter, general version, respondents 
were first warned: “some politically motivated groups use 
misleading tactics to try to convince the public that there is a 
lot of disagreement among scientists.” This claim was then 
debunked by reiterating that scientific research has found that 
among climate scientists, there is virtually no disagreement that 
humans are causing climate change. In the longer, more spe-
cific inoculation condition, additional arguments were added to 
debunk the Oregon Petition specifically (e.g., by highlighting 
that some of the signatories are fraudulent, including Charles 
Darwin and members of the Spice Girls, that fewer than 1% 
of the signatories have a background in atmospheric/climate 
science, etc.).
The design of the experiment follows a linear-additive format 
(Table 1)—i.e., in both the consensus- and countermessage-
only conditions, respondents only read the relevant message 
in isolation. In the general inoculation condition, respondents 
first read the consensus statement, followed by a general inoc-
ulation, before being exposed to the countermessage. In the 
detailed inoculation condition, respondents were first shown 
the consensus message, followed by the general inoculation 
and then the more detailed inoculation message, before being 
exposed to the countermessage. This design allowed us to 
assess the marginal benefit of the (two) inoculation strategies. 
A full description of all treatments used in Study 2 is provided 
in part B of the Supporting Information.
The main dependent variable is a respondent’s (pre and post) 
estimate of the current level of scientific agreement on human-
caused climate change (0%–100%). In addition, subjects were 
also asked how certain they are about their estimate, how likely 
they think it is that climate change is happening, whether they 
believe it is human-caused, how much they worry about the 
issue, and whether people should be doing more or less about 
climate change. To disguise the true purpose of the experiment, 
participants were told that they would randomly be asked about 
1 out of 20 possible media topics (the topic was always the 
same). All subjects were presented with the same question set 
before (pre) and after (post) the treatments were administered. 
A manipulation check was also included to verify the efficacy 
of the treatment effects. An overview of the sample character-
istics (and census data for comparison purposes) is provided in 
Table 2. A description of the MTurk procedure and platform is 
provided in Part B of the Supporting Information.
3. Results
All of the hypotheses were fully supported by the data. Descrip-
tive within-subject differences in perceived scientific agreement 
are reported in Table 3 and Figure 1. As expected, no mean-
ingful pre–post change in perceived consensus was observed in 
the control group (Mdiff = 0.35). The consensus-treatment (CT) 
Table 1. Overview of experimental conditions.
Experimental treatment conditions
1. Control group
2. Consensus (“pie chart”) treatment (CT)
3. Countermessage (CM)
4. Consensus-treatment followed by countermessage (CT | CM)
5. Consensus-treatment + general inoculation followed by countermessage (In1 | CM)
6. Consensus-treatment + detailed inoculation followed by countermessage (In2 | CM)
Table 2. Sample characteristics.
Sample (N = 2167) Census
Demographic characteristics
Gender (% female) 56 51
Age 18–65+ (modal bracket) 25–44 38
Education (% college degree or 
higher)
50 32
Region (% Northeast) 17.3 17.7
Party affiliation (% Democrat) 37 32
Note: US population 2013 census estimates. Age (median). Political party affilia-
tion estimate by Pew (2013).
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alone elicited a large increase in perceived scientific agreement 
(Mdiff = 19.72). In contrast, the (misinformation) countermes-
sage (CM) had a substantial negative influence (Mdiff = −8.99) 
when presented on its own. When participants viewed the mes-
sages sequentially (CT | CM), the informational value of the 
consensus-treatment was negated completely (Mdiff = 0.51). As 
hypothesized, the general (In1 | CM) and detailed (In2 | CM) 
inoculation interventions were each successful in preserving 
much of the positive effect of the consensus message in the 
presence of counterinformation (Mdiff = 6.47 and 12.71—or 
one-third and two-thirds of the initial consensus-treatment 
effect, respectively).
To test whether these differences are statistically signifi-
cant, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted with 
the post-test as the dependent variable and the pretest as the 
covariate. The ANCOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
the treatment groups, F(5, 2160) = 82.10, mean squared error 
(MSE) = 443.92, p < 0.001, 0.162pη = . Post hoc comparisons on 
the adjusted marginal means using the Tukey honest signifi-
cant difference (HSD) test indicated significant between-group 
differences for all the previously stated comparisons (p < 0.001). 
There was one exception, as expected, the difference between 
the control group ( 0.35x = , standard error (SE) = 0.36) and the 
“neutralizing” (CT | CM) condition (x 0.51= , SE = 1.39) was not 
significant.
A number of manipulation checks were performed to assess 
the consistency of the results. At the end of the survey, partic-
ipants were asked, using a seven-point scale, to indicate how 
convincing they found the experimental treatments. Respond-
ents who only viewed the consensus-treatment thought the mes-
sage was significantly more convincing than those who viewed 
the consensus message in the presence of counterinformation 
( 5.11x =  vs 4.80x = ), t(1237) = 2.42, p < 0.01. Similarly, par-
ticipants who viewed the counterinformation by itself thought 
it was significantly more convincing than when viewed in the 
presence of the consensus-treatment ( 3.71x =  vs 3.26x = ), 
t(1037) = 3.13, p < 0.01. In a similar vein, respondents who 
found the consensus-treatment more convincing (median split) 
adjusted their estimate of the scientific consensus at a higher 
rate than those who were less convinced ( 8.18 5.86x x= > = ), 
t(1526) = 1.72, p < 0.05).
Next, within-subject differences in perceived consensus 
were examined for each treatment condition by political party 
identification (Table 4). On the whole, the pattern is strikingly 
similar across party lines, i.e., the consensus-treatment on its 
own elicits the greatest change, the countermessage by itself 
has a negative effect, sequential messaging neutralizes the 
positive effect of the consensus-treatment while the general 
and specific inoculation conditions both successfully preserve 
similar proportions of the treatment-effect across political party 
affiliation.
Yet, two observed differences are noteworthy. First, the 
effect of the consensus-only treatment is somewhat larger 
(descriptively) for Republicans (Mdiff = 23.00) and Independents 
(Mdiff = 19.05) compared to Democrats (Mdiff = 15.78). Second, 
Figure 1. Overview of mean (pre–post) differences in perceived scientific 
consensus by treatment group. Note: CT = consensus treatment, CM = 
countermessage, In1 = general inoculation, In2 = detailed inoculation. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Table 3. Descriptive overview of mean (pre–post) differences in perceived scientific consensus by treatment group.
Treatment conditions Perceived scientific consensus  
[%] (pretest mean)
Perceived scientific consensus  
[%] (post-test mean)
Difference (post-pretest)  
(standard error)
Cohen’s D  
(vs control)
Control group (n = 360) 72.18 72.53 0.35 (0.36) –
Consensus-treatment (CT) (n = 338) 70.58 90.30 19.72 (1.17) 1.23
Countermessage (CM) (n = 392) 72.04 63.05 −8.99 (1.31) 0.48
Consensus-treatment (CT) | CM (n = 352) 73.48 72.99 −0.51 (1.39) 0.04
CT + general inoculation | CM (n = 363) 73.29 79.76 6.47 (1.32) 0.33
CT + detailed inoculation | CM (n = 362) 71.23 83.94 12.71 (1.17) 0.75
Table 4. Descriptive overview of mean (pre–post) differences in per-
ceived scientific consensus by political party affiliation.
Treatment conditions Democrat  
(n = 788)
Independent  
(n = 646)
Republican  
(n = 390)
Control group 0.74 −0.67 1.90
Consensus-treatment (CT) 15.78 19.05 23.00
Countermessage (CM) −9.11 −8.50 −9.03
Consensus-treatment (CT) | CM 0.57 1.61 −8.03
CT + general inoculation | CM 4.48 6.97 6.92
CT + detailed inoculation | CM 11.08 12.79 10.75
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while the presence of misinformation “neutralizes” the effect of 
the consensus-treatment for both Democrats (Mdiff = 0.57) and 
Independents (Mdiff = 1.61), it has a negative effect on Repub-
lican respondents (Mdiff = −8.03). In other words, on average, 
only Republicans reduced their consensus estimates when they 
viewed the consensus message followed by the counterinfor-
mation. Accordingly, an ANCOVA revealed a small but signifi-
cant interaction between the treatment conditions and political 
party, F(11, 1805) = 2.12, MSE = 415.77, p = 0.02, p 0.01
2η = ). 
Main results are presented in Table 4 and Figure 2.
A main effect was also found for belief certainty, F(5, 2160) = 
52.94, MSE = 2.09, p < 0.01, 0.112pη = . Post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey Honest Significant Difference (HSD) test indicated that 
the consensus-treatment and inoculation conditions significantly 
increased belief certainty of consensus estimates compared to the 
counterinformation and control groups (p < 0.01). On average, 
the consensus-treatment (by itself) increased belief certainty (1–7 
scale) by (Mdiff = 1.63, SE = 0.11) versus (Mdiff = 0.62, SE = 0.09) 
in the presence of counterinformation. As expected, much of the 
initial effect was preserved in both the general and more detailed 
inoculation conditions (Mdiff = 0.90, SE = 0.09 and Mdiff = 1.21, 
SE = 0.10). Finally, the treatments did not have notable main 
effects on other key beliefs about climate change—with the excep-
tion of normative support for public action, F(5, 2160) = 13.54, 
MSE = 0.41, p < 0.01, 0.032pη = . Compared to the control group 
(p < 0.05), the consensus-message (by itself) had a small positive 
main effect ( 0.14x = , SE = 0.05).[63]
4. Discussion
This study finds that public attitudes about climate change 
can be effectively “inoculated” against influential misinforma-
tion. In particular, our results point to three important conclu-
sions. First, consistent with prior work, we find strong support 
for the efficacy of communicating the scientific consensus on 
human-caused climate change.[7,19,38,43,44,47] Second, this research 
further extends these findings by presenting information about 
the consensus in a politically “contested” information environ-
ment, that is, countered by a real petition claiming that there is 
no scientific consensus on human-caused climate change. As 
such, we help address the criticism that prior experiments “do 
not realistically model the real-world dynamics of opinion forma-
tion relevant to the climate change dispute” (ref. [49], p. 16).
Results indicate that the positive influence of the “consensus 
message” is largely negated when presented alongside such 
misinformation. Thus, in evaluating the efficacy of consensus 
messaging, scholars should recognize the potent role of mis-
information in undermining real-world attempts to convey 
the scientific consensus. Third, the current study also found 
that much of the initial consensus-effect was preserved (up to 
two-thirds) by the inoculation messages, which, importantly, 
proved equally effective across the political spectrum. Accord-
ingly, “inoculation” is a promising approach to protect public 
understanding of the extant scientific consensus that human-
caused climate change is happening, which, as prior research 
has shown, acts as an important “gateway” cognition to other 
keys beliefs about the issue.[7,17]
Some scholars have argued that because people sometimes 
engage in “identity-protective motivated reasoning,” highlighting 
scientific consensus will only cause or exacerbate existing atti-
tude polarization.[37] Yet, “true” attitude polarization in response 
to mixed evidence is relatively infrequent (ref. [64–66] and recent 
research suggests that political polarization on climate change 
is more likely the result of selective exposure to partisan media 
rather than motivated reasoning alone.[48,50,67,68] Moreover, this 
study finds no support for the hypothesis that inoculating people 
about the scientific consensus backfires among those who are 
ideologically predisposed to be skeptical about climate change 
(e.g., Republicans), which is both promising and consistent with 
other research on inoculation theory (e.g., see ref. [60]). In fact, 
we extend inoculation research in a novel direction by testing its 
efficacy in the context of a highly politicized issue.
This is not to say that the motivated processing of political 
information does not occur.[33] For example, simple corrections 
can backfire among the targeted ideological group.[69] Other 
recent research has suggested that communicating the scien-
tific consensus on climate change may backfire among strong 
“free-market” endorsers.[47] Similarly, we find that when the 
consensus and countermessages were presented sequentially, 
Republican respondents were, on average, indeed more likely 
to weigh the “no consensus” treatment more heavily in their 
subsequent judgment of the scientific consensus. Yet, it is 
important to note that even in this case, highlighting scientific 
agreement is still beneficial, as the magnitude of the observed 
“negative effect” among Republicans is actually less (or at the 
very least, no different) from what it would have been if no con-
sensus information had been presented at all. In other words, 
Republican respondents who only saw the countermessage 
decreased their estimate of the scientific consensus more than 
Republican respondents who saw both messages. Thus, we find 
no evidence that conveying strong normative agreement among 
experts “backfires” with potentially skeptical audiences.[70]
More importantly, both inoculation messages proved effec-
tive in protecting the positive effect of the consensus message 
Figure 2. Overview of mean (pre–post) differences in perceived scientific 
consensus by political party affiliation. Note: CT = consensus treatment, 
CM = countermessage, In1 = general inoculation, In2 = detailed inocula-
tion. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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and shifted the opinions of Republicans, Independents, and 
Democrats alike in a direction consistent with the conclu-
sions of climate science. Moreover, these results are consistent 
with other recent research, which has also found that warning 
people pre-emptively of counterattitudinal messages can help 
reduce directional motivated reasoning (e.g., see ref. [8]).
Practically, these findings suggest that, when possible, com-
municating the scientific consensus on human-caused climate 
change should be accompanied by information that forewarns 
the public that politically or economically motivated actors may 
seek to undermine the findings of climate science. In addition, 
audiences should be provided with the “cognitive repertoire”—
a basic explanation about the nature of disinformation cam-
paigns— to pre-emptively refute such attempts. In short, these 
findings add to a growing body of research reporting that com-
municating a social fact, such as the high level of agreement 
among experts about the reality of human-caused climate 
change, can be an effective and depolarizing public engage-
ment strategy.[7,19,43,44,47]
Finally, this study is of course not without limitations. First, 
we were unable to assess the rate of decay (if any) of the effect 
of the inoculation messages. However, other recent research 
has indicated that the positive effects of attitudinal inoculation 
do persist over time (e.g., ref. [71]), although more longitudinal 
research is needed. Second, while great care was taken to ensure 
a representative design, laboratory research is limited in its ability 
to simulate the structure of an individual’s information environ-
ment. Thus, we look forward to and encourage future research to 
test and extend these findings in real-world (field) settings.
5. Conclusion
In a large experiment (N = 2167), we show that communicating 
the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change sig-
nificantly increases public perception of the expert consensus 
by about 20 percentage points (Bar I, CT-Only). Importantly, 
the introduction of (mis)information contesting the existence 
of a scientific consensus neutralizes the positive effect of high-
lighting normative expert agreement (Bar III, CT|CM). Further, 
in the absence of any cues about the actual level of consensus, 
the presentation of misinformation significantly undermines 
the public’s perception of the level of scientific agreement 
(−9 points; Bar II, CM). Finally, pre-emptively warning people 
about politically motivated attempts to spread misinformation 
helps promote and protect (“inoculate”) public attitudes about 
the scientific consensus (Bars IV and V, In1 | CM and In2 | CM).
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